- Global tools
- Server Error
- Gurlitt: Stray Leaves, Op. Cornelius Gurlitt | Piano Duets & Four Hands Sheet Music
- Access Check
The three Scandinavian countries continued to try to build common ground for their approach to the Middle East conflict. But just as before, this was creating problems. Generally, Sweden was less pro-Israel than Norway and Denmark. This had been the situation ever since , when the UN mediator, the Swedish count and member of the royal family, Folke Bernadotte, was murdered by a Jewish terrorist group Yitzhak Shamir, later Prime Minister, belonged to the leading troika which ordered the murder.
Norway, on the other hand, was the country least supportive of the Palestinians. Throughout the s, as in the s and s, the Norwegian grant to UNRWA, the United Nations organization helping the Palestinian refugees, was way below the grants given by Sweden and by Denmark. Among Norwegian politicians and Foreign Ministry officials, there was a definite lack of interest for the Palestinian refugee problem. It was regarded as more or less impossible to solve; the Arab states would not absorb them and Israel refused to take them back.
The outbreak of the third Middle East war in demonstrated once again the traditional cleavage in Norway between the political environment and the press which strongly supported Israel and the critical and less supportive Ministry of Foreign Affairs. On this occasion the Labour Party was not in power: However, this shift of government did not have any consequences for Norwegian policy towards the Middle East. As usual, the political milieu sided with Israel. As in , the last time the conflict in the Middle East had been drifting towards war, the Norwegian Labour Party launched a campaign to rescue the threatened Jewish State.
An appeal was signed by public figures in Norway. A committee in support of Israel was established, led by former UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie, who, since , had regarded the establishment of Israel as his personal creation. In emotional reports from the war, he asked young men and women to voluntarily join the fight to help rescue the little state, fighting for its life. This was a precondition for withdrawal from the Occupied Territories. Israel was still generally regarded as a small, innocent country, threatened by aggressive Arab enemies.
Moreover, this security approach showed clearly how Norwegians in general accepted the Israeli version of the conflict. But, as ever, this was not the case at the Foreign Ministry. When Egypt, just before the outbreak of the war, closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli ships and other ships delivering strategic goods to Israel, Norway joined in the criticism being levelled at Egypt by the two leading Western shipping nations and NATO allies, the United States and Great Britain.
The principle of free passage should be respected. But when Britain, supported by the US, favoured a military operation, the Foreign Ministry declined to even participate in a consultation about such an option. The Ministry also turned down a suggestion from the Western allies to send in ships, escorted by naval vessels.
Internally, there were even disagreements as to whether Egypt really had acted against international law by closing the Straits of Tiran. The Norwegian permanent delegation to the UN, prior to the outbreak of the war, even claimed that it would be unfortunate if the Israeli government received too much support in their uncompromising views towards the Tiran closure because Israel might see such support as an additional argument for attacking Egypt.
In the UN, Norway supported Resolution As time went by, Israel did not withdraw from the territories occupied during the war. The Foreign Ministry felt that both Egypt and Jordan, for their part, were willing to fulfil the Resolution. International law, and not military superiority, was the only legitimate way to maintain peaceful coexistence among nations. Last, but not least, the Foreign Ministry commonly used its peace argument: Norway had to protect its engagement both in UN peacekeeping operations and in a future peace process.
Norway was not asked to participate. The Arab states were unwilling to accept military contributions from countries like Norway and Denmark that had voted against unconditional withdrawal. However, contributions to peace had also been an important aspect of Norwegian foreign policy. For the Foreign Ministry, it was important not to be ruled out of a possible future Norwegian role in a peace process. During the s, Norway had increasingly participated in peace processes around the world, among other things as a secret channel between the US and North Vietnam.
The future peace process argument could easily be used as an argument for a less pro-Israel policy. But, unfortunately for the Ministry, the Arab states were not at all willing to accept Norway as a part of any peace process at all. Norwegian Middle East policy was far too biased in support of Israel. Norway, so close to Israel, was not seen as suitable for the task. These views were almost unknown beyond the walls of the Ministry. They were not for public consumption and were normally set out only in classified documents.
This picture changed slowly as a consequence of the Six Day War in The effect of this war contributed to a new attitude: Another important precondition for the establishment of the Oslo Back Channel was in place. Prior to , Israel had been regarded as the weak, threatened party in the Middle East. In an opinion poll taken immediately after the Six Day War, 74 per cent said that they sympathized with Israel. The leading figures in the Norwegian Labour Party, as already mentioned, celebrated the Israeli victory. But they had become older, and were in fact on their way out of positions of power.
The previously restrained younger generation, now in the process of assuming leading positions, became increasingly critical. This new generation within the Labour Party began to work for justice on behalf of the Palestinians. They wanted information and contact with the other side in the Middle East conflict. This new stance was a component in the political radicalization of Norwegian society in the s. Their representatives started to view the conflict in a North - South perspective. Seen from that angle, it was not Israel, but the Arab states that deserved sympathy. The Arabs had been exploited by the imperial Western powers.
The fate of the Palestinians became the new big issue on the left. Before , the Palestinians were generally neither called nor regarded as Palestinians. Among both Norwegian politicians and officials the problem received little attention and was on the whole considered hopelessly insoluble. After the Six Day War, this changed. This was explicitly stated within the Foreign Ministry. Their actions against Israel — and Israeli retaliation — only made the situation more tense. However, from this new concern for the Palestinian cause was also reflected in larger amounts of money.
Having been virtually absent as a foreign policy issue for twenty years, the Palestinian refugee question came up for discussion in Parliament. Not surprisingly, this highly unrealistic proposal was turned down, but it marked a watershed: It would take another six years before such a proposal won a majority vote.
The first person to do this officially was Prime Minister Per Borten, who at the time headed the non-socialist coalition government, in a speech at the United Nations in Although this was little more than a symbolic gesture, it nonetheless inaugurated a new era.
- JSTOR: Access Check.
- Destined: Years from Home #3 (Years from Home Trilogy).
- Stray Leaves, Op. | Sheet Music Now.
Prominent cabinet members, such as Prime Minister Borten and Foreign Minister John Lyng, along with Foreign Ministry officials, saw and stated officially that there could be no political solution to the problems in the Middle East unless the rights of the Palestinians were included in future solutions. But while the old solution - mass integration in the Arab countries - was abandoned, the alternatives were very unclear. In accordance with these new sentiments, John Lyng, as early as the autumn of , issued three principles that were supposed to establish the basis of a Norwegian Middle East policy: In the autumn of , Foreign Minister Andreas Cappelen from the new Labour government, went a step further in a speech to the UN General Assembly claiming that there would be no justice or political solution to the conflict in the Middle East unless the rights of the Palestinians were taken into consideration.
Most likely, both Borten and Cappelen were reflecting deeper and wider changes in Norwegian society, both with regard to the PLO and Israel. The younger generation was not affected by the Holocaust in the same way as the old one. On the contrary, many of them were shocked by the injustice done to the Palestinians. They were the victims of the Middle East conflict. The new generation, some of whom would take on leading political positions, described the fate of the Palestinians as their parents had described the fate of the Jews.
Israel should cease to exist as a Jewish state and be replaced by a new and democratic state where Jews, Muslims and Christians all had equal rights. But it was not only the present situation of the Palestinians that was viewed differently. The old friends of Israel, still wielding considerable political influence, rushed once again to the rescue of the small and threatened Jewish State.
Having more experience to draw upon, they more or less copied the campaign from , even to the point of reactivating the same slogan. Articles favourable to Israel were distributed to the media. As always when Israel was considered to be in utmost peril, Haakon Lie — who now held no formal position in the party - visited the country, to show his Labour comrades that Norway could be relied on in moments of crisis.
The Norwegian Labour Party was among its few remaining friends. In June , the Israeli ambassador in Oslo, in a report to Jerusalem, made the following remarks regarding the situation in the Norwegian Labour Party: Trygve Bratteli is ill, consequently the biological evolution is working against us. From now on we shall have to rely on the young ones, this will not be easy. At the beginning of the s, the PLO began to demonstrate a new will to compromise and a more moderate approach. At the same time, the Palestinian organization improved its international position.
The PLO was not yet willing to abandon the military struggle against Israel, including the use of terrorist methods, but simultaneously, it was emitting other signals. This was a new point of departure for later negotiations and contacts. The United Nations passed a resolution accepting the rights of the Palestinian people. These happenings on the international scene came to have a major impact on the shaping of Norwegian Middle East policy.
He — and Foreign Ministry officials along with him — was of the opinion that representatives of the Palestinians should be included in international organizations such as the United Nations. However, he had strong doubts and reservations. Both the Israeli and the Egyptian governments lobbied the Ministry to support their respective views. Norway should follow the other Western countries. By taking this position, the Foreign Ministry would be marking a stronger understanding for the Palestinian cause.
This stance was also on the whole in line with Norwegian opinion in general, i. It turned out, however, that the decision went much further than political circles and most Norwegians were willing to contemplate. A barrage of angry protests was aimed at the minister. The persistent support for Israel within the Labour Party was consequently still a factor to reckon with when shaping Norwegian Middle East policy.
The group, initially comprising as many as 83 of the Members of Parliament, was not regarded as very powerful prior to the Norwegian pro-Arafat vote in October The campaign came to abrupt halt when the Labour Party discovered that a majority of its representatives in Parliament had signed the petition. Any more signatures would have guaranteed the resignation of the Foreign Minister. Although he had initially given Frydenlund the impression that the Arafat decision was acceptable, Prime Minister Trygve Bratteli backed down when temperatures began to rise.
In the emotional debate that followed in Parliament, Bratteli said nothing of substance to support his Minister. But the rest of Labour and the whole non-socialist bloc condemned him strongly. The whole episode resulted in a strong political backlash for Knut Frydenlund. The episode secured the continued pro-Israel line. That same autumn, the Norwegian UN delegation retreated to the traditional anti-Palestinian position. On 22 November a huge majority of the member states of the UN decided that the PLO should be given observer status and take part in the sessions of the General Assembly.
The Norwegian UN delegation was instructed to vote against the resolution, a decision taken by the Cabinet.
Only eight countries voted against: In addition, the members of the younger generation brought with them a more radical approach which contributed decisively to this development. In January , for the first time, members of all the political parties in Norway travelled to the Arab countries. Ever since the creation of Israel in , most Norwegian politicians had seen the conflict through the eyes of Jerusalem. If they visited the Middle East, and many did, they went to Israel. In addition, many of their views were highly emotional. They knew next to nothing about the political, economic, social and cultural situation in the Arab countries or about the situation of the Palestinians living in the refugee camps in the Arab countries surrounding Israel.
- Passeavase el Rey Moro.
- THE PRIME MINISTERS PROMISE - A Story for Christmas and Beyond.
- - File or directory not found.?
What they saw and experienced on their trip to the Arab countries in the region, came as a surprise to them and consequently had a major influence on and implications for their view of the conflict. In contradiction to their perceptions about who the bad and the good guys were in the Middle East conflict, Arab leaders like King Hussein of Jordan and President Anwar Sadat of Egypt had made a very good impression on the Norwegian parliamentarians. Both had expressed their willingness to negotiate peace with Israel and although the visit to Israel had also been pleasant, as expected, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin had showed his less charming side.
Israel, as well as the Arab states, had to carry the blame for the lack of peace. The members of the Committee of Foreign Affairs were important actors when it came to influencing Norwegian Middle East policy, other parliamentarians and public opinion.
The trip to the Middle East had affected even the staunchest friends of Israel on the Committee. The Israeli government wanted to remove the Palestinian guerrilla forces who were using Lebanon as a base for attacks. Haddad, having deserted from the Lebanese Army, saw it as his main task to protect the Christian villages along the Israeli border. When the Israeli military machine swept over South Lebanon, approximately , Lebanese refugees, mostly Shia Muslims, left their homes and were pushed further into a Lebanon torn by civil war. The Christian villages, on the other hand, welcomed the Israeli presence.
The Israeli government, as always deeply suspicious of the UN, did not want any UN presence on its border. Such a force would restrict the freedom of the Israeli army to operate across the border in South Lebanon. Instead of fighting Palestinian and Lebanese guerrillas, the Israeli army would be faced with UN soldiers, bringing with them a message of peace. Security Council Resolution mandated the UN force to supervise the Israeli withdrawal to the international border between Israel and Lebanon, re-establish peace and security in South Lebanon and, additionally, help the Lebanese government re-establish its authority in the region.
The Israelis did indeed withdraw. A week later this figure had risen to Those Norwegians who served under the UN banner had almost certainly gone to the Middle East strongly influenced by the massive, pro-Israeli version of the conflict that reverberated through the Norwegian mass media and the population in general.
Many of these Norwegians came back with a completely different view. They had begun to realize that the conflict was far more complicated, and that it was not just the Palestinians and the Arab states that were to blame. On the contrary, their experiences with the Israelis served to undermine the received version. The stories brought home by the soldiers and which they told to their friends and relatives, were of importance when it came to widened perspectives and changed perceptions.
Furthermore, the media were suddenly no longer dominated by reports on the Middle East giving the usual Israel angle on the stories. Norwegian journalists moved out of Tel Aviv and Jerusalem and started to pay attention to the situation in South Lebanon. As a consequence, a massive increase in reports from refugee camps and coverage of the conflict between the Israeli army and PLO guerrilla groups was evident in the Norwegian media.
As were reports on Beirut nightlife, drunken Norwegian soldiers, hard discipline and low pay. In addition to the Palestinian and Lebanese refugees, who they mostly regarded as victims, and consequently felt sorry for, the young Norwegian soldiers were confronted with the tough Israelis. So, on the whole, as a consequence of the contribution to UNIFIL, the Norwegian people were shown a different Middle East reality, a reality that changed their perceptions of the conflict.
This Norwegian involvement in Lebanon also had major implications at the governmental level. Relations between the Norwegian and the Israeli governments started on a downward spiral. The Americans were asked to use their influence on the uncompromising Israelis. Again Norway considered withdrawing. Once again the Norwegian government decided to stay. Again, however, nothing changed on the ground in South Lebanon. As the traditionally warm relationship with Israel became somewhat tense, the relationship with the PLO improved and gradually expanded.
Already before there had been some informal contacts with the PLO, although they had been irregular and at a low level. But demands for improved contacts were increasing, particularly from Norwegian diplomats stationed in the Middle East.
For them, it was almost impossible to get a firm overview of the situation in the region without closer relations with the PLO. From , this dialogue got a further boost when central Norwegian diplomats met high-ranking PLO representatives. Even though relations with the Israelis deteriorated greatly during the Norwegian mission in the region, the government in Oslo still managed to keep open the long-established channels to Israel.
On the Palestinian side, the contacts had to be built from scratch. From time to time, the more extreme sections conducted other policies and created problems for the UN soldiers. Especially in the eastern part of the area controlled by the Norwegian battalion, the Norwegians were attacked and came under fire. He used to warn Longva in advance whenever his sources told him of impending attacks. Soon a system evolved whereby officials and state secretaries, but not Norwegian Prime or Foreign Ministers, could meet leaders of the PLO. Nonetheless, this situation came to have new implications for the formation of Norwegian Middle Eastern policy, not only in the short run, but even more so in the long run.
New information was flowing into the Foreign and Defence Ministries, and to the Norwegian public in general. Another direct consequence of the UN military involvement were the new Norwegian contacts that were established with the Arab and Palestinian side. And ultimately, further off on the horizon, these developments pointed towards a recognition of the PLO.
But there was still a long way to go. By the end of the s a shift was clearly taking place. Labour Party politicians, high-ranking Norwegian officials and defence leaders had all met with the higher echelons of the PLO. Norwegian - Palestinian contacts were developed with that old bastion of pro-Israeli sentiment, the Federation of Trade Unions, the LO. When a PLO delegation visited Norway in October — after being invited by the trade union federation — the ice was definitely broken. A new attitude was in the air.
As the new generation was being absorbed into the Labour Party and the movement as a whole, it brought with it ideas that were different from the old ones. Although Norway slowly started to move towards a more balanced Middle East policy, it had become clear during the s that Norway was isolated in Europe in its restrictive policy towards the PLO. And since that moment, almost nothing had happened with official Norwegian policy towards the PLO. In the meantime, major changes had occurred internationally: Israel had become much more isolated.
The Jewish State still refused to contemplate negotiations with the PLO or to give up any of the land it had conquered. For the first time a peace agreement was signed between Israel and Egypt, and Israel agreed to give Sinai back. But the part dealing with the Palestinians and the rest of the Occupied Territories never materialized, and the opinion throughout the world continued to turn against Israel, a development that was particularly noticeable among the majority of the European states.
In fact one could almost write off en masse the entire European Union as being pro-Israel. Even the Netherlands, traditionally considered a pro-Israeli country, sharply criticized Israel for its line on the Palestinian question and voted against Israel in international forums. For the European countries and Japan the oil blockade weapon was more decisive for their change to a more pro-Arab stance than it was for the Americans. In Norway, these developments among its Western friends and allies were noted, but had little influence on the shaping of its Middle East policy.
Knut Frydenlund was nursing his wounds and fearful of the reactions both from within the Labour Party and, increasingly, from the non-socialist opposition. An extremely circumspect Norwegian Foreign Minister indicated in two interviews during the summer of that the Palestinians and the PLO ought to be a part of the peace negotiations in a more extensive sense. Norway was in the process of becoming increasingly isolated, he pointed out.
A decreasing number of countries belonged to the same group as Norway when votes on Middle Eastern questions where cast in the UN. Norway had one of the most restrictive policies towards the PLO in the world. Frydenlund could have said much more, but — for obvious reasons — refrained from doing so. The Israeli Labour Party, represented by its leader Shimon Peres, was also a member of the Socialist International, although without recognizing the PLO representatives in an official capacity.
However, when an international organization like the Socialist International and prominent Labour politicians like Brandt and Kreisky found it opportune to have official contacts with the PLO and its leader, this was a very clear indication of the drift of public opinion in the Western countries. But Norway continued to differ. Neither Frydenlund nor the leader of the Labour Party, Reiulf Steen, were prepared to countenance similar direct contact yet.
Stray could see no reason why Norway should have any contacts at all with an organization still favouring the use of terrorism as a weapon in their struggle to reach its goal. Fortunately for the Foreign Minister, the Norwegian government was not required to take a stand, either in the Security Council or in the General Assembly. When Israel was heavily attacked for the settlement policy on the West Bank and the bombing of South Lebanon, the Norwegian UN delegation did not even mention Israel by name.
Gurlitt: Stray Leaves, Op. Cornelius Gurlitt | Piano Duets & Four Hands Sheet Music
Even the Americans went further in their criticism than did Norway. In the UN, Norway took such a cautious stand that one would have been forgiven for asking if Norway had any Middle East policy at all. Of course, Norway did have a Middle East policy. It was still strongly supportive of Israel, overly cautious towards the Palestinians in general and the PLO in particular, and it was coming under increasing pressure. On the one hand, the pro-Israel lobby in Norway still had a firm grip on final outcomes and decisions.
On the other, support for the Palestinian cause was steadily increasing, even to the point of demanding acknowledgement of the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people. This issue was forcing its way to the surface. In a debate in Parliament concerning the rights of the Palestinians 31 October , Foreign Minister Frydenlund went a step further than he had done in the summer: The question was still causing domestic trouble, not least because of the strong opposition in Parliament. However, he added, adjustments were taking place, indicating that a change in attitudes was occurring.
By the beginning of the s, direct contacts with the PLO on a governmental level were still taboo. Obviously, the man behind it, Longva himself, was personally convinced that the blame for the lack of peace in the Middle East ought to be placed elsewhere. But, importantly, in the light of later events, this policy was also linked to a possible future Norwegian role as a bridge-builder and mediator in the Middle East.
Undoubtedly, the role of the Palestinians and the PLO was taking on an increasingly prominent role in the Middle East debate in Europe in the s. At the same time, Norway was isolated, a remote country in this European context - not only geographically - hanging on to its inflexible stand on the Palestinian question. Neither oil blockades nor acts of terrorism persuaded the majority of Norwegians to abandon their pro-Israel position and see the conflict from the Arab - Palestinian side as well. This effort resulted in the Oslo agreement, a Declaration of Principles that was to pave the way for the establishment of the Palestinian Self-Government Authority and mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO.
Surprisingly enough, at least at first glance, it was neither Norway nor Israel that drew Norway into a mediating position. Arafat considered Norway an important channel because of its close connections with Israel rather than in spite of them. He saw Norway as a channel that could be used in possible negotiations in the future and felt that Norway was a serious and civilized country that could not be accused of playing along with its own national interests.
In addition to the close links to the enemy, Norway also had strong ties with the USA, something that was also definitely needed. In one way or another, the US would have a major role to play in any peace negotiations in the Middle East. The former UN Ambassador, Hans Engen, had played an important mediating role in the aftermath of the Suez crisis in At that time, however, neither Engen nor the Foreign Ministry back in Oslo were interested in playing the role of bridge-builder in the Middle East.
Unlike earlier times, Norwegian authorities were now on speaking terms with the Palestinian side. In , Israel and Egypt made peace. As a consequence, in , during the negotiations for the second Israeli - Egyptian Disengagement Agreement, Israel was about to relinquish its oil fields in Sinai. Originally, Iran had promised to guarantee the supply of oil to Israel. But after the revolution in Iran, this was no longer a serious option. The US, on its side, had promised to supply its ally and had a problem. American eyes fell on Norway which had recently discovered oil in its waters.
Norway was asked to pledge oil deliveries to Israel, to replace the missing Iranian oil. In the political infighting over the new Norwegian oil resources, the government basically preferred not to side with anybody at all on the international scene. It sought to maintain a compromising, bridge-building attitude.
However, many of the players on the international scene resented this. Several argued that Norway should use its oil resources as a political instrument to either help or to punish countries. It was expected in particular that Norway should take a stand in times of turbulence and disagreements in the oil market. In this context, the single most difficult issue for Norway was Israel.
The question of Norwegian oil to Israel had first been raised with Prime Minister Lars Korvald in , when he was on a private visit to Israel. Korvald had been taken completely by surprise. At this stage, Norway hardly had any oil at all. However, Korvald had told the Israeli Deputy Finance Minister the one who raised the issue that an initiative at this early stage would hardly serve any Israeli objectives. However, in the autumn of , in the wake of the Camp David Agreement and the crisis in Iran, it was raised again with a greater sense of purpose, first by the Israelis themselves and then by the USA.
The Americans were obliged to deliver oil to Israel and, probably for political reasons, the USA regarded Norway as a suitable member of the team. Others, like Minister of Finance Per Kleppe, warned against giving in to what he saw as troublesome American pressure.
State Secretary Thorvald Stoltenberg set out a long list of pros and cons and concluded that neither Israel nor the USA had thought through the problems which Norway might have to face. However, after discussing the matter, the Norwegians said no. It was claimed that no oil was available. In addition, Israel was not an obvious market. If Norway helped Israel for political reasons, other countries, NATO allies for instance, might be expected to be treated in the same generous way.
Another significant cause for concern was the fear of adverse Arab reactions and countermeasures. At the political level, an oil guarantee to Israel could easily be seen as a threat to the new and fragile relationship with the PLO which was of great importance to the Foreign Ministry. This was, however, a standard Foreign Ministry argument whenever Norwegian policy was likely to get, in one way or an other, too pro-Israel, as they saw it.
The Export Council and the Norwegian Ship Owners' Association also warned against boycott actions and loss of markets. The government therefore concluded that while Norway was willing to help, it had to be done within a broader international context. In this particular case, Norway tried to avoid taking a stand on the possible dilemmas. It came as a surprise both to Longva and the Foreign Ministry in Oslo that Arafat found the deal unproblematic.
As a trade off for his acceptance of a possible Norwegian - Israeli oil deal, Arafat wanted something in return: Israel, at this time, was governed by the hawkish Likud and wanted nothing to do with the PLO. Foreign Minister Frydenlund was, not unexpectedly, positive and willing to serve as a possible back channel. In the coming years this option surfaced on several occasions but the problem of strong Israeli resistance remained.
Knut Frydenlund was the driving force in Norway, Longva his local representative. From until the summer of Longva was stationed in Beirut. Throughout this time, Longva travelled often to the Middle East and kept close contact with Arafat and his closest associates. In a conversation between the two in September , Arafat expressed disappointment at the lack of diplomatic progress.
As he saw it, the countries in Western Europe were the only ones who could be expected to have any influence on the shaping of the American Middle East policy. A year later, Arafat again underlined the importance with which he viewed Norway. Norway was an important member of NATO. Norway had close relations with the USA.
Both Frydenlund and Longva acknowledged that a future solution could only be found in a two-state solution, a partition. However, nothing concrete came out of the Norwegian talks with the PLO. In , the Labour Party lost power in Norway and a Conservative government took over. Contrary to what one might expect, this change of government did not influence the informal contact already established with the PLO. Stadt Marburg , , 5. See also the website of the Kirchenchor Baden St Stephan, http: The Hessisches Musikarchiv currently maintains a website devoted to Jenner: Kohleick consulted with her while working on his biography of Gustav Jenner.
See Kohleick, Gustav Jenner , [i]. Johannes Brahms, Klaus Groth , ed. Volquart Pauls Heide in Holstein: Westholsteinische Verlaganstalt Boyens, , —4. Essays in Honor of Paul Henry Lang , ed. Norton , , Susan Gillespie, in Mendelssohn and His World , ed. See also Jenner to Klaus Groth, 17 February , trans. The image also appears in Heussner, Gustav Jenner , None of these three sources gives a copyright holder for the image.
Of the major musical figures who taught, the most conscientious shared with Brahms a concern for nurturing the artistic individuality of their students. See Kohleick, Gustav Jenner , On 6 February, the vocal trios were heard again, alongside piano works of Jenner played by Baumayer, the first pianist Brahms entrusted with his Second Concerto. In some of these cases, the serenade served as a training ground for symphonic writing much as it did with Brahms and Jenner.
He also remained engaged with Brahms in the concert hall during this period, for instance conducting the German Requiem in Marburg on 11 December The Review Group Members thank all who took time and effort to share their ideas. IC Legal Reference Book You have selected to open If you would like to not see this alert again, please click the "Do not show me this again" check box below. Do not show me this again Cancel Continue.